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Heterodoxy: challenging orthodoxies about heterosexuality 
 
The intention of this article is to challenge certain orthodoxies regarding heterosexuality—
orthodoxies which have tended, in critical literatures, to constitute heterosexuality as a static 
monolith, an unvarying, commanding mass, and queer theories, identities and practices as the 
only potential source for a less oppressive sexuality. By contrast, we wish to consider 
heterodoxy within heterosexuality by exploring possibilities for non-normative pleasure and 
change within the realm of the dominant.  
What do we mean by ‘heterodoxy’ in this context? In general usage, heterodoxy is 
that which is at variance with, or that which differs or departs from the accepted, the 
standard, the status quo, the orthodox (Oxford English Dictionary 2012), without necessarily 
being its opposite. Heterodoxy refers to a leaning toward the unorthodox. In departing from 
the strictly orthodox, it may extend to the dissident, but falls short of heresy. In several recent 
publications (Beasley et al. 2012; Holmes et al. 2011), we begin to set out alternative 
approaches to heterosexuality. This paper provides an opportunity to develop and expand that 
approach. For us ‘heterodoxy’ is an apt term in that ‘hetero’ signifies both ‘difference’ and 
heterosexuality: it enables thinking about heterosexuality differently, if tentatively. We see 
our understanding of the heterodox reflected in a line from Leonard Cohen’s song ‘Anthem’: 
‘[t]here is a crack in everything, that’s how the light gets in’.  
In order to develop an alternative approach to heterosexuality, we first of all discuss 
in more detail how and why we employ the term ‘heterodoxy’. Following this, we outline 
three brief examples of departures from the normative. These departures are figured as 
divergence, transgression and subversion, all of which are more closely detailed in our earlier 
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work mentioned above. In this paper our examples are employed as succinct illustrations 
aimed at developing a clearer articulation of the term heterodoxy, as well as an initial 
methodological framework for future work. The examples presented offer a basis for 
consideration of some phenomenological terminologies that might be helpful for analysis of 
experiential movements between normativity and heterodoxy. The intention here is to 
consider not just the degrees to which practices might depart from the normative, but also 
how these departures are experienced. This conjunction offers a means to acknowledge 
heterosexuality’s coercive aspects while attending to its more egalitarian, less orthodox 
forms. 
Our discussion is, however, presently limited to English-language sources and 
western Anglophone contexts. Moreover, the focus is upon sexualities and to a lesser extent 
gender. Significant discussion of, for example, racialised/ethnic, disability, age and class 
variations remains beyond the scope of this paper. While elsewhere we have given some 
consideration to these, and aim to attend more closely to them in further work, here we 
foreground sexualities, gender and the theme of heterodoxy. This focus alone involves an 
substantial endeavour which can only be broadly outlined in a single paper. 
 
Why heterodoxy? 
We intend in this article to expand on earlier work in which we challenged the very common 
account of heterosexuality in critical gender/sexuality scholarship as nasty, boring and 
normative. Debates regarding this mainly pessimistic characterisation of heterosexuality are 
outlined in greater depth in Beasley et al. (2012). To summarise, we noted in that account that 
gender/sexuality scholarship is inclined to focus on heterosexuality’s more negative and 
disturbing aspects while, at the same time, casting it as uninteresting. That is, heterosexuality 
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is usually critically conceived as homogeneous and synonymous with heteronormativity (see 
for example Carroll 2012; Reis and Grossmark 2009; Dworkin [1987] 2007; Bhattacharyya 
2002; Heise 1997). Such presumptions play out the antagonisms of the ‘sex wars’, which 
raged in the 1980s but continue to be both implicitly and explicitly deployed in contemporary 
sexuality debates. The sex wars involve a dispute over whether sex is primarily dangerous or 
should be embraced as pleasurable (Duggan and Hunter 2006). Moroever, in this dispute 
pleasure is routinely constituted as residing in ‘queer’—meaning non-heterosexual—sex 
(Richardson 2004). The oppositional stances of the sex wars thus leave heterosexuality in a 
dark, dull corner, its positive potential for joy and social change virtually unacknowledged 
and unexplored (but see Jackson and Scott 2007; 2001; Meah et al. 2011).  
For us, considering the term heterodoxy means finding fissures in the supposed 
monolith of heterosexuality, and examining where the light gets in. In doing so, we do not 
examine important but well explored aspects of heterosexuality—such as prostitution, sexual 
violence, sexual trafficking, or cultural representations of heterosexuality –but rather consider 
less frequented corners. However, before attending to how to undertake potentially 
heterodoxical research, it is helpful to clarify why we might embark upon this challenge to the 
orthodox account of heterosexuality as unpleasant and offering no recourse to social change. 
In this setting, we suggest that it is is necessary to challenge the orthodoxy that 
heterosexuality is homogeneous and synonymous with heteronormativity. 
A crucial feature of heteronormativity is that it propounds a hegemonic coherence 
against which all sexualities—including heterosexual practices themselves—are judged. This 
expressly requires a suppression of diversity even within heterosexuality (see also Berlant and 
Warner 1998: 548; Jackson 2006, 2005; Richardson  2004; Seidman 2005: 40) and a lack of 
appreciation of its fluid and dynamic aspects (Hockey et al. 2007). Nevertheless, with few 
exceptions, critical gender/sexuality scholarship continues to conflate heterosexuality and 
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heteronormativity as one and the same. Yet, if heterosexuality is simply equated with 
heteronormativity, the hegemonic coherence of heteronormativity is ironically upheld. 
Furthermore, since change is conceived as occurring only at the margins, the majority of the 
populace can be inferred to be mere robotic conformists condemned to stand outside the gate 
of historical change. In contrast, our concern is to ‘undo’ heterosexuality, to undo the illusory 
homogeneity and authority of the heteronorm, in similar fashion to Butler’s ‘undoing’ or 
‘troubling’ of gender (Butler 2004, 1990).  
In the relatively rare discussion of non-normative sexual directions in relation to 
heterosexuality there has sometimes been an inclination to posit ‘queer heterosexuality’. 
While we employ ‘queer’ to describe a particular approach or mode of theorising, and as 
usually linked to LGBTI sexualities (Ahmed 2006a; Richardson 2004), we deliberately do 
not use it as an easy synonym or umbrella term for the non-normative.1 Why not? Why focus 
on the heterodox rather than the queer? 
First of all, there are certain problems attached to the conjunction of queer and 
heterosexuality. The conjunction has provoked debates about the appropriation of queer for 
use in relation to heterosexuality (see for example Brook 1996; Schlichter 2004; Davidson 
2005). ‘Queer heterosexuality’ looks suspiciously like a push for heterosexuality to ‘have it 
all’, to be both dominant and marginalised, such that heterosexuality invites itself along to the 
fashionably cool queer party without having had to pay the dues of marginalisation. Concerns 
about appropriation of the queer by heterosexual interests sometimes have practical 
manifestations. Recent (unsuccessful) requests to have a ‘Queer Heterosexuality’ float at the 
Sydney Mardi Gras, for example, produced controversy in a Facebook discussion over 
whether renouncing self-designation as heterosexual was necessary to queer identification, 
and relatedly whether the ‘exclusion’ of heterosexuals from the rubric of queer sexuality is 
problematic.2  
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Apart from practical political issues about who or what can be queer, there are further 
reasons to hesitate regarding the appellation of ‘queer heterosexuality.’ The radical potential 
of ‘queer’ to precisely signal the refusal of the homosexual/heterosexual binary, as well as 
highlighting the uncertainty and permeable fluidity of identity categories, may be said to sit 
awkwardly, or even incoherently, alongside any retention of a focus on heterosexuality 
(Beasley 1999: 82, 88; Butler [1997] 2013: 471-2). As A. Isaiah Green points out, queer 
thinking is about ‘radical deconstruction’ and ‘radical subversion’ (2007: 28-9). Queer 
thinking denotes an ‘opposition to hegemonic norms’, a protest against the ‘normal’ and 
‘static, norm-regulated identities’ (Showden 2012: 8; see also Warner 2012).3 
 
By contrast, we would suggest that the broader arena of the non-normative is not 
inevitably as challenging as that to which the term ‘queer’ can more confidently lay claim. 
Indeed, the non-normative, as will be outlined shortly, may often include more mundane 
everyday activities, which are not always self-consciously directed political acts, or 
inevitably in opposition to the normative (Hockey et al. 2007; see also endnote 1). To obscure 
the diversity of the non-normative by potentially sloppy over-use of the term ‘queer’ to 
encompass all sorts of practices not only risks diminishing its vital political significance, but 
also risks loss of recognition of a variety of more nuanced, fragile moments in analysis of 
social change. Perhaps the notion of a ‘queer heterosexuality’ might be best considered as a 
very specific, particularly challenging departure from heterosexual normativity. Our aim, 
however, is to consider a wider range of departures from the orthodox. 
This range includes those departures that might be merely contingently divergent to 
those which move towards the dissident and even heretical—that is, towards sexualities 
which might be more clearly aligned with the queer. In short, we wish to make a case for the 
significance of the term heterodoxy as signalling an extensive variety of non-normative 
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heterosexual possibilities or innovations relevant to broader analysis of social change. 
Importantly, these innovations may continue to draw upon elements of the 
homosexual/heterosexual binary and do not presume the collapse of distinguishable sexual 
identity orientations. In other words, they may involve innovations within heterosexuality but 
nevertheless resist aspects of heteronormativity.  
 
Figure: Heterosexualities—from normative to heretical 
Insert Figure here 
Instead of heterosexuality looking like a homogenous monolith, in this Figure we 
visualise a framework for considering a range of non-normative elements in the realm of the 
dominant. At its normative core, where heterosexuality is indeed equated with 
heteronormativity, we can see what might be termed ‘cissexuality’—a space where sexed 
body, gender, sexual orientation, desire, sexual practice and inter-relationality align neatly 
with what is deemed to be the honoured or hegemonic form of heterosexuality (Harrison 
2013: 12-13; Johnson 2013: 12).4 Beyond this are comfortable and unthinking normative 
options which are perhaps less strictly or entirely aligned with the hegemonic, but which are 
nevertheless hegemonically satisfactory and ‘do the job’.5 An example of this ‘good enough’ 
normativity in a contemporary western setting might be a cohabiting heterosexual couple who 
remain unmarried. From this point onwards we begin to step into potentially non-normative 
terrain. In the figure above, this stretches from ‘divergence’ through to the entirely 
‘heretical’.  
Let us now turn briefly to the three departures from heteronormativity mentioned 
earlier: divergence, transgression and subversion. We use these examples because all fall 
short of the more radical possibilities that might be associated with the term ‘queer 
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heterosexuality’. We focus on them precisely to fill out the meaning of ‘heterodoxy’ and to 
consider the spaces for social change that, to our way of thinking, include much more than 
radical opposition. The discussion of these examples is necessarily schematic given 
limitations of space. For similar reasons, we focus on the conceptual/terminological, though 
there is reference to empirical scholarship and practical illustration. Divergence is closer to 
the norm than transgression, which in turn is closer than subversion. To diverge involves 
moving a little away from the norm while remaining within its purview, whereas to transgress 
involves straying from the straight and narrow path, but without that necessarily being the 
intention. By comparison, to subvert requires undermining the norm in a more reflexive 
fashion, although not always radically. 
Divergence 
Our first departure from the heterodox contests orthodoxies even at the centre of 
institutionalised heterosexuality—in this case, marriage. The orthodox view in critical 
gender/sexuality research is that heterosexual marriage is utterly and enduringly boring and 
normative: it is a bastion of heteronormative privilege. In this context, anti-gay US 
commentator Paul Cameron, for example, comments that ‘[m]arital sex tends toward the 
boring’ (Cameron as cited by Dreyfuss 1999). Cameron’s view is repeated, in general, by 
critics as well as defenders of heteronormativity. We do not wish to suggest that marriage is 
in fact a hotbed of exciting heterosexual innovation. However, we do question the way that 
heterosexual marriage and heteronormativity are so readily and routinely collapsed. We 
prefer to ask: does heterosexual marriage fall short of thoroughgoing heteronormativity? if 
marriage is not just a repository for homophobic and sexist imperatives, how might it be 
better conceptualised and understood?  
Our heterodox approach to marriage seeks to challenge the orthodoxy that marriage 
and heteronormativity are virtually identical. We are concerned here to consider what we 
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have described as divergence from relentless conformity, to recognise that even in the 
seeming heartland of the heteronorm, the rhetorically effortless identity of marriage and 
heteronormativity is never quite realised. In a range of gender/feminist and sexualities 
scholarship, marriage has been positioned as a disciplining institution, as something whose 
primary function is to naturalise heterosexuality and gender roles. Adrienne Rich’s (1980) 
landmark essay on compulsory heterosexuality marks the beginning of a clear trajectory of 
scholarship on sexuality which suggests that marriage is heterosexuality’s premier institution 
(for example Emens 2009; Robson 2009; see also Jackson 1996: 24). There seems no space 
here for inconsistency. 
In this context, while differences in conceptualisation and opinion amongst and 
between gay and lesbian thinkers on marriage are often acknowledged (see, for example, 
Rimmerman and Wilcox 2007; Gust et al. 2003; Stychin and Herman 2000; Wintemute and 
Andenæs 2001; Wolfson 1994), heterosexual perspectives remain likely to be treated as 
singularly hegemonic. Despite some academic accounts of intimacy and personal life that 
now acknowledge diversity in heterosexual relationships (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; 
Budgeon and Roseneil 2004), the notion of ‘the heterosexual family’—singular, uniform— 
remains commonplace (see Ferguson 2007: 43 et passim). Yet heterosexual marriage is not 
one hegemonic structure. Instead we argue the position that (heterosexual) marriage is an 
institution whose meaning and effects for heteronormativity are dynamic and not entirely 
certain—a seemingly obvious, yet rarely acknowledged point. We note that 
acknowledgement of the possibility of inconsistency, the possibility of divergence, the 
existence of less than complete conformity, is an important means to open the conceptual and 
empirical gate to a more developed and dynamic account of sociality and social change. 
Commentators like Robert H. Knight (American conservative writer, activist, and 
drafter of the US Defense of Marriage Act) argue that enabling same-sex marriage would 
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mean the complete evacuation of its personal and institutional meaning (Knight 1997). We 
assert that this wrongly positions marriage as, historically, always and inevitably 
heterosexual. It is not. Even as it has indisputably policed and protected heterosexuality, 
marriage has been peopled by sexual subjects who resist categorisation as straightforwardly 
or merely heterosexual. Such subjects include, most obviously, transgendered spouses (Ford 
2000; Eskridge 1996) but also include non-normative heterosexualities. A number of 
matrimonial, divorce, and family law judgments attest to spouses behaving in non-
normatively heterosexual ways. The example of a wife who relentlessly badgered her 
exhausted husband for sex until he sought a divorce on grounds of her cruelty (see Willan v. 
Willan 1958 and Willan v. Willan 1960, UK, in Brook 2007: 90-1), suggests the existence of 
something other than a narrowly ‘straight’, let alone a socially honoured mode of gendered 
heterosexuality. Furthermore, other judgements complicate the assumed concord between 
reproductive and hetero-sex that characterises marital heteronormativity. Consummation 
within a marriage, for instance, has been held not to have legally occurred, despite the 
husband and wife having had a child who was their biological offspring (Clarke v. Clarke 
1943, UK, in Brook 2007: 75). Such examples are hardly routine, but appear as cracks in the 
institutional masonry of marriage. They represent moments of divergence from the normative 
(despite not operating as deliberate political protests) which should not be discounted or 
rendered invisible beneath the generality of marriage as institutional heteronormativity. 
 Clearly, marriage has exhibited homophobic and sexist tendencies: more than this, 
the regulation of conjugality has, at certain moments, been primarily dedicated to 
heteronormative purposes (Brook 2007). However, marriage does not merely naturalise, 
reward and protect heterosexuality. If the effect of institutionalised marriage is to preside 
over and mask a range of identities and practices, vesting them with falsely heteronormative 
uniformity, rejecting this characterisation becomes politically salient. We envisage here a 
 10 
 
theorisation of conjugality in which heterosexuality is not always or inevitably complicit in 
constructing institutional privilege, even though it may be heteronormatively enveloped. This 
work may require attention to detail, but even in very narrow fissures, light may get in.  
 
Transgression 
Beyond the normative core, a heterodox approach is even more significant when considering 
transgressive possibilities for misbehaviour, lapses, and indiscretions as offences against the 
hetero-norm. These offences may edge towards lawbreaking, without deliberately 
undermining ‘hetero-law’.  
We suggest that it has become an orthodoxy to view queer sexualities as the site of 
transgressive sex. By contrast, heterosexuality continues to be critically assessed as typically 
unpleasant and inequitable (Beasley 2011, 2012). On this basis it is viewed as of limited 
theoretical interest and is implicitly equated with political stasis (see Rossi 2011:10). Thus, 
reassessing the link between transgression and heterosexuality becomes important because 
transgression can be politically significant. Elizabeth Wilson asserts, when discussing the 
example of a woman using a dildo on her male sexual partner, that no matter how 
transgressive or ‘queer’ this couple might feel themselves to be, to the world they are just 
‘kinky’ heterosexuals. Many other examples of transgression exist,6 and perceptions of what 
might be deemed ’kinky’ vary. However, the crucial point here is that Wilson does not think 
that transgressive experimentation with sexual practices and roles makes any meaningful 
contribution to social change (Wilson 1997: 169). 
Against Wilson, we argue that transgression can invoke possibilities for politics. 
‘Kinky’ or otherwise innovative heterosexual sex is not always or necessarily politically 
meaningless. To rehearse the catchphrase of second-wave feminism, the personal remains 
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political, and the effects of a range of sexual practices are not necessarily confined to the 
private. Hence we reconsider innovative sexual (that is, ’private’) conduct in terms of the 
political. In this context, the term transgression is especially useful for our investigation of 
heterodoxy. Transgression in the realm of heterosexuality is not necessarily about decisive 
ruptures, breaks, or fissures. While it may include a more overt invocation to law-breaking 
that connects private practices to public politics, it also retains a broader association with 
‘wrongdoing’, and ‘wandering’.7 It becomes possible to consider private sexual conduct, such 
as innovative hetero-sex, as a potential moment of transgression. 
We see transgression as a term that is more about straying from, rather than 
undermining normative regimes. Heterodox ways of ‘doing heterosexuality’ (Rossi 2011:20) 
require theorisation which moves beyond the simple equation of heterosexuality with 
heteronormativity. However, if heterosexuality is not a heteronormative ‘closed book’, what 
might transgression in the realm of the dominant look like? 
We have several thoughts on this, but will mention just one for now. In 
conceptualising a transgressive heterosexuality, it is necessary to attend to the privileging of 
phallic hetero-masculine sex and, for us, this indicates a necessary confrontation with the 
abjection of the penetrated. Pro-sex queer theorists have raised doubts about the seemingly 
self-evident hierarchical relation between the penetrator and penetrated (Thomson 2011: 243, 
250). By contrast with Wilson’s rather disparaging assessment of innovations in penetrative 
hetero-sex, this seems to us a useful direction when thinking about the meaning of 
transgression. 
Queer theorising unravels stereotypical gendered/sexual alignments such that, for 
example, the penetrated cannot be presumed to occupy a particular gender or a particular 
sexual orientation, and is not necessarily located as socially subordinate or sexually abject. 
For example, Bobby Noble and Ann Cvetkovich draw attention to an active sexual receptivity 
 12 
 
that defies traditional sexual taxonomies in their discussions of gender queer, butch-femme 
and gay male ‘bottom’ narratives (Noble 2007:161-164; Cvetkovich 1995:136-137). In 
considering transgressive possibilities we must be equally alert to the complex ways in which 
people occupy and perform heterosexual practices.  
 
Subversion 
Our outline of heterodox heterosexuality now moves beyond the transgressive to explore 
subversive possibilities. Subversion involves a more purposeful, conscious challenge to the 
orthodox. Where transgression can be an accidental straying from the norm, subversion is 
more deliberate, even if not undertaken as a deliberately ’political’ stand. And, while 
transgression has a more temporary aspect, subversion entails taking a slightly more lasting 
path. As noted with regard to transgression, subversive challenges to heterosexuality are not 
limited to merely exotic forms of sexual relating. Diverse forms of heterosexuality can 
subversively exceed the heteronorm: think of deliberate childlessness for example. However, 
given limitations of space, here, we will just consider one form, which in this case upsets 
normative assumptions about heterosexuality as always or inevitably assuming cohabiting 
couple relationships. Although non-cohabitation of partners is not new, nor necessarily 
revolutionary, contemporary decisions to not co-reside with a partner can signify and produce 
a reflexive questioning of the centrality of heterosexual relationships in people’s lives 
(Roseneil 2005). Non-cohabitation also returns us to an issue raised in relation to 
transgression in suggesting that some heterosexual couples might ‘undo’ heteronormative 
accounts of hetero-sex as necessarily equivalent to penetrative penis-vagina sex. 
Some non-cohabiting couples subvert hegemonic heterosexual ‘sexual scripts’ 
(Gagnon and Simon [1973] 2005), which designate physical closeness to be a key sign of the 
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commitment, familiarity, privileged knowledge, and active caring that supposedly comprise 
intimacy (Giddens 1992: 96-8; Jamieson 1998: 8; Lasch 1995: xiii-xvii; 138-140; Smart 
2007). Heterodox forms of non-cohabiting intimacy may include couples living apart together 
(‘LAT’—that is, couples who live separately), some of whom live nearby and others in 
‘distance relationships’ (see Duncan and Phillips 2010; Holmes 2006). Such relationships 
reveal that proximity does not guarantee intimacy, and intimacy can be maintained without 
proximity (Baldassar et al 2007; Holmes 2010, 2004). All relationships deal with some 
degree of physical and emotional distance occasionally (Simmel [1908] 1971), but some 
heterosexual couples more obviously subvert hegemonic norms of cohabitation and hence 
understandings of heterosexual coupledom, commitment and intimacy. 
Non-cohabitation can involve deliberate efforts to find more independent or mutual 
ways of relating (Holmes 2004). Such heterodox forms of intimacy may well be responses to 
increased geographical mobility and other practices to which many people are compelled by 
processes of globalisation (Elliott and Urry 2010; Bauman 2003). Non-cohabitation not only 
potentially involves challenges to the normative heterosexual ideal of legitimate commitment 
but clearly suggests some questions about what constitutes sexual relationality. Living 
together is not always sexually exciting or even satisfactory, and living apart does not 
necessarily reduce sexual pleasure or activity (Gerstel and Gross 1984: 62-6). 
 Not cohabiting may sometimes offer more sexual excitement than cohabiting. Not 
cohabiting can avoid over-familiarity. Being apart often may force couples to communicate 
better, avoid conflict and enhance romance (Holmes 2004; Gerstel and Gross 1984: 74-7). 
Doing heterosexual relationships differently can bring a feeling of exploration and 
excitement, or quieter but nonetheless subversive enjoyments, including those mobilised in 
communications, imaginings and memories. Relatedly, some forms of non-cohabiting 
intimate heterosexual relationships can also provide heterodox experiences of ‘the sexual’, 
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which subvert the importance usually given to penetrative penis-vagina sex. Doing things 
differently, even if not challenging the normative in markedly radical or ‘queer’ terms, can 
nevertheless provide opportunities for pleasure and possibilities for change. 
 
Between normativity and innovation: considering terminologies/methods for 
the exploration of heterosexual heterodoxy 
The figure (above) used to visualise the non-monolithic diversity of heterosexualities 
suggests a terrain of socially situated and embodied practices ripe for empirical research. In 
keeping with understandings of ’queer’ as a verb rather than noun, as a range of actions rather 
than modes of identity or being (Sullivan 2003, 50, Showden 2012, 9), our aim is to enable 
research on heterosexuality to invoke a sense of dynamism and inter-relational uncertainty, 
such that heterodoxy is conceived as processual, as non-normative practices, rather than as a 
question of ‘types’ of identities or even coherent or ongoing behaviours. Heterodoxy may be 
temporary, contingent, and fleeting, as well as sometimes deliberate, decisive and ongoing. 
Such different temporalities may exist simultaneously with regard to different practices. In 
this setting, it becomes crucial to move beyond a schematic plane of heterosexual possibilities 
(as illustrated in the figure), towards consideration of how we might recognise, conceptualise 
and research experiential movements between normativity and innovation.  
To prepare the ground for such empirically based research we draw upon and 
reconfigure certain phenomenological terminologies employed within queer postcolonial 
thinking that might be useful in fleshing out the schematic paradigm so far outlined. These 
terminologies are chosen as a starting point because they focus on how queer subjects move 
between normativity and queer possibilities. While they focus on queer trajectories, these 
terminologies can nevertheless provide a means to grasp how heterosexual subjects might 
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interact with and sometimes move between the borders of normativity and degrees of 
heterodoxy.  
Tulia Thompson (forthcoming) both draws upon and reworks terminologies employed 
by Sara Ahmed in her book, Queer Phenomenology (2006a).8 Thompson’s discussion 
provides a basis for reconsidering these in the setting of heterosexual heterodoxy. Thompson 
notes that Ahmed’s usage of phenomenological terms tends to construct the experiential 
through ‘an individualised human body as the vehicle for perception’ (Thompson 
forthcoming: 47, emphasis added). This is despite Ahmed’s linkage of sexual/bodily ‘orient-
ation’ with the politics of colonialism. For Thompson, the analysis of queer subjects’ 
movements between normativity and innovation requires a less Eurocentric, less 
individualised account—one which is not just perceptual, but more strongly integrates inter-
subjective, communal, systemic and institutional imperatives (Thompson: 47, 55, 35). In this 
context, Ahmed’s use of terms like ‘orientation’, ‘lines’ and ‘directions’ as ways to describe 
the accrued constraining force of social requirements (Ahmed 2006a: 11, 14-16, 21) may 
appear as somewhat too linear and individually oriented. We suggest, in the context of 
developing concepts to aid in researching heterodoxy, that it may be helpful to talk about 
‘scenarios’ which emphasize active inter-relational contextual location rather than a singular 
path or line of sight.  
There may be similar issues with Ahmed’s employment of the terms, ‘straightening’, 
‘stopping’ and ‘disorientation’ (Ahmed 2006a: 66-67, 92, 139, 140). ‘Straightening’ refers to 
experiences of being brought back into line with normativity, ‘stopping’ to coming up against 
social obstacles which impede shifts away from normativity, and ‘disorientation’ to moments 
in which there is an awareness of other possibilities than the normative. These terms may also 
tend towards the assumption of an individualised perceptual subject. However, we consider 
that they do perhaps enable some space for thinking about and investigating heterodoxy 
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empirically. All the same, such terms tend to have a more dramatic and perhaps more 
oppositional stance—perhaps arising from their particular relevance to and focus on queer 
subjects. For this reason we prefer the term ‘swivelling’ developed by Thompson 
(forthcoming: 134) to denote the less radical inclination of many straight and queer people to 
turn back and forth between normative and heterodox possibilities in relation to sexuality, 
indicating an active and unceasing modulation rather than the linearity of a queer path which 
is interrupted—which tends to be the way Ahmed’s terms describe experiential movements. 
Why make a point of such terms? For us, they suggest qualitative markers for 
empirical investigation. It is possible to ask subjects to consider whether they might have felt 
they were straightened up or stopped in relation to their experience of heterosexuality, 
whether they felt they were required to swivel back and forth between the accepted and the 
less orthodox, or whether they ever felt disoriented and had a sense of alternatives with which 
they were not familiar. Such qualitative markers can provide a means for articulating 
experiential movements within and across a taxonomy of heterosexual scenarios. 
 
Conclusion 
Bhattacharyya’s summative point regarding the social location of heterosexuality—that is, 
straights ‘are just straight’ (2002: 22)—cannot be all that sexuality scholarship says about the 
subject. In this context, it is asserted that non-normative possibilities should not be 
understood as available only at the social margins. Instead, such possibilities may be intrinsic 
within even dominant practices like heterosexuality. Heterodox ways of ‘doing 
heterosexuality and heterogenders’ (Rossi 2011:20) require conceptual theorisation and 
empirical scrutiny in ways which move beyond the equation of heterosexuality with 
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heteronormativity. With this aim in mind, how then might heterodoxy be understood and 
investigated?  
Developing the notion of heterodoxy provides a means to critically examine a number 
of orthodoxies about heterosexuality, enabling exploration of possibilities for change even 
where these are not self-consciously or deliberately political. In order to undertake this 
exploration we firstly outlined why heterodoxy might be a useful way of discussing the non-
normative, and then used three gradients of dissent to illustrate this—divergence, 
transgression and subversion. Finally, we turned from these illustrations to a brief account of 
potentially useful terms drawn from queer postcolonial thought to explore how subjects might 
experience location within and movement across these gradients.  
The conjunction of examining diverse practices in heterosexuality, along with a focus 
on experiential turning points, is primarily aimed towards the development and use of the 
term ’heterodoxy’, but is also intended to signal an initial methodological framework for 
future theoretical and empirically based work. By this means, we hope to better understand 
and contest heterosexuality’s coercive aspects while also gaining a better understanding of 
how more egalitarian forms of heterosexuality might be possible. 
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Figure: Heterosexualities—from normative to heretical 
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1 We employ the term non-normative to evoke a wide range of ‘non-standard’ possibilities with regard 
to heterosexuality, thus enabling attention to everything from the mundane or everyday (see also 
Hockey et al 2007) to that which might be deemed sensational, surprising, rare or even bizarre. The 
term is intended to include the counter-normative—that is, more purposeful and oppositional 
possibilities—but encompass possibilities which are much less consciously chosen. 
2 This example arises from personal communication with Peter Banki, 27 February 2013. 
3This linkage of queer with radical and oppositional is however not the only meaning it is sometimes 
given. For example, Ahmed suggests two rather less challenging  characterisations, such as bent or 
offline, or simply a synonym for LGBTI—referring specifically to lesbian (Ahmed 2006b: 565; see 
also Beasley 2005). However, even in these less challenging characterizations do suggest a stronger 
degree of counter-normativity than the than the full range of non-normative possibilities we are 
highlighting. 
4 This terminology is still emerging and there are several meanings attached to it. However, it is 
typically located as the antonym of ‘transsexual’ and in our usage combines ‘cisgender’ (alignment of 
sex designated at birth with gender identification) and ‘straight’—that is, we use it as a shorthand for 
clear-cut alignment with heteronormative heterosexuality. See also Urban Dictionary, Definition of 
cissexual (2013) and Oxford English Dictionary, Definition of cisgender (2013). 
5 See Rossi (2011) on ‘happy’ heterosexual performatives. 
6 Other examples might include some possibly more confronting heterosexual activities—such as sex 
in public places like car-parks and public gardens, group sex, women purchasing paid sex, non-
monogamy/swinging/‘polyamory’, gender ambiguous sexual fantasies (see for instance Hazell 2009; 
Bell 2006; Mazur [1973] 2000; Anapol 1997; Easton and Liszt 1997; Segal 1994). 
7 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Volume 2, 5th edition (2002: 3327, 3684). 
8 See also Ahmed (2006b: 543-574). 
                                                          
